Introduction: Immigration and the Allure of Inclusion by Roman, Ediberto
  
 
1349 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Immigration and the Allure of Inclusion 
Ediberto Roman1 
INTRODUCTION 
The legal predicament of Victor Navorski is a classic tale of a man 
without a country and is unfortunately replete with metaphors for 
the plight of immigrants to this land.  Navorski’s saga begins when 
he is detained at the border of the United States, which in his case is 
at one of New York City’s airports.  He is legally unable to leave his 
port of entry and locale of detention because the government 
of his homeland, Krakozhia, was recently overthrown and the 
United States has not recognized the new regime. After surviving 
in a legal and literal state of limbo for several months, Navorski 
eventually musters up the courage to illegally cross the border by 
leaving the airport  in order to enter the United States and fulfill his 
family’s dream. 
Victor Navorski’s saga was not addressed in the media or 
courtrooms but in theaters and home videos, as he is a fictional 
character played by Tom Hanks in the film “The Terminal.”2 
Navorski’s character is based on the tragic real-life saga of Merhan 
Karimi Nasseri, who after being expelled from Iran without a 
passport has lived in France’s Charles de Gaulle Airport since 
1988.3  Nasseri has been unable to leave the French airport 
because his briefcase containing legal documents, including a 
refugee certificate permitting him to reside in England, were 
 
 1 Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Florida 
International University.  Much thanks goes to Professors Troy Elder, Angelique 
Ortega Fridman, and Jose Gabilando for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
essay. 
 2 "The Terminal," DreamWorks Pictures (2003). 
 3 See Mark Baker, Lost in the Judicial Wilderness: The Stateless Corporation 
After Matimak Trading, 19 NW. J. Int’l. L. & Bus. 130 (1998); Craig S. Smith, 16 
Years on an Airport Bench, and 15 Minutes of Fame, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2004, at 
A4. 
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stolen in a French train station.4  Because it is based on fact, Nasseri’s 
saga is obviously far more consequential; nonetheless, both stories 
in many ways trace the trials of legal and illegal immigrants 
throughout the Western world. These two stories reflect, in a 
microcosm, the real-life trials of millions of immigrants; the 
protagonists are faced with immigration regimes that are 
apparently filled with arbitrary distinctions, irrational 
motivations, and bureaucratic nightmares. 
I. IMMIGRANT STORIES 
Essentially, all immigrant stories concern labels and their 
consequences, including the fiction of the legal and illegal 
“alien.”5  These labels in turn are created by immigration 
regimes that have the effect of establishing identities of both 
welcomed and unwelcome newcomers into a society.  These 
fictions or labels occur within what can be described as the 
legal fiction of the nation-state.  In many respects, all 
immigrant debates and accounts are tales of inclusion and 
membership within legal frameworks that decide which groups 
of people are deemed worthy of eventual formal membership 
within a political structure.  Indeed, the label of “alien” situates 
persons as “outside of ‘We the people’ and therefore places 
them by definition as outsiders.6  Typically, under western 
immigration systems, those deemed worthy of membership are 
classified as legal aliens or immigrants, who in turn are allowed 
the right to convert their status to full participants within the 
society, known as naturalized citizens. The naturalized citizens are 
contrasted, in immigration parlance, with those that are 
deemed to have entered the nation-state illegally; in other words 
individuals who arrive in ways that are inconsistent with the 
means deemed appropriate by the nation-state are deemed to be 
illegal aliens.  For all intents and purposes, illegal aliens, exist in 
the shadows of the society with virtually no political presence or 
rights.  In fact, the label of illegal alien alone justifies the 
disregard of any pretense of rights that should be afforded to 
“legal” members of society.  For instance, in explaining why 
Haitians in the early 1990s were repatriated to their homeland 
without any judicial or administrative process, in apparent 
 
 4 See Matthew Rose, Waiting for Spielberg, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003 at 82. 
 5 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Aliens” in our Midst Post-9/11: Legislating Outsiderness 
Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683 (2005). 
 6 Id. at 1685. 
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violation of international law, President George H. Bush 
declared that these individual were not refugees but “illegals.”7  
All too often, unfortunately for those groups in need or desire 
of entry, the distinctions between the appropriate and 
inappropriate methods of entry do not appear to be based 
upon sound moral or legal grounds or justifications. 
Both the Navorski and Nasseri stories contain symbolisms 
that illustrate these ambiguities and arbitrary enforcement of 
immigration laws.  For instance, in both situations the victims 
of the legal conundrums, through no fault of their own, were 
prevented from leaving their peculiar place of detention—an 
airport—and could not legally leave those confines in order to 
fulfill their wishes of entering their targeted countries. 
Using what is termed here as the Navorski-Nasseri 
phenomenon as a rhetorical tool, this essay briefly reviews 
aspects of the exclusionary history of domestic immigration law 
and juxtaposes the rhetoric of inclusion associated with 
immigration and this country’s history of racialized 
exclusionary immigration practices. After describing the 
apparent disconnect between notions of inclusiveness associated 
with the rational structure of U.S. immigration law and 
immigration policies in practice, this essay develops a fictional 
analogy using three imaginary countries to highlight the 
dramatic differences in the implementation of U.S. immigration 
law.  Against this backdrop, the essay then discusses the articles of 
Maria Pabon Lopez, Jose Miguel Flores, and Arthur Read that are 
part of the immigration cluster of LatCrit IX.  The Lopez article 
explores the aftermath of the Plyler v. Doe,8  decision and its affect on 
undocumented children.  The Flores piece explores the effect of 
globalization on luring Latin American communities to the United 
States.  The Read piece questions the propriety of the President’s 
proposed guest workers’ program. 
II. THE FICTION OF INCLUSIVENESS UNDER  
DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION REGIMES 
America is all too often described as a nation of immigrants.  
From the welcoming words at the feet of the statute of liberty inviting 
the poor, the tired, and huddled masses yearning to be free, this 
national creed or narrative suggest a welcoming and inclusive land.  
 
 7 Id. 
 8 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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Notwithstanding the millions of immigrants that can bear witness to 
this national narrative, the history of mass migration to this land is 
also filled with examples of policies and practices that evince 
anything other than a welcoming narrative.  Perhaps the most 
obvious disconnect between an inclusive national narrative and 
practice is evidenced by this country’s treatment of racial minority 
immigrants.  While the United States is the among the most open 
nations in terms of acceptance of immigrants, with hundred of 
thousands admitted every year, the history of United States 
immigration demonstrates that for people of color, and other 
disfavored groups, legal immigration to this land was all too often an 
elusive rather than an inclusive proposition.  Professor Bill Ong Hing, 
in his book, Defining American Through Immigration Policy, traces the 
earliest manifestations of immigration limits.9  He notes that the fear 
of foreigners motivated early attempts at immigration control; 
including the 1798 Alien and Sedition laws which were aimed at 
silencing political opposition and French revolutionaries.10  Similarly, 
in his book The ‘Huddled Masses’ Myth, Dean Kevin Johnson traces 
what he terms as the darker and harsher aspects of this country’s 
immigration story.11  Dean Johnson methodically traces the little-
known racialized history of exclusion in U.S. immigration laws.12  This 
exclusionary history against racial minorities is believed to have 
begun in the 1800’s with local, state, and federal exclusion and 
mistreatment of Chinese immigrants.13  These laws included: 
Congress’ passage of the Chinese exclusion laws that effectively 
barred all Chinese immigration,14 and the Supreme Court’s 
endorsement of Congress’s virtually absolute power to exclude 
foreigners in The Chinese Exclusion Case.15  Other examples include: 
the 1907-1908 Gentleman’s Agreement between the U.S. and Japan, 
which severely restricted Japanese immigration,16 The Immigration 
 
 9 BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 
(Temple Univ. Press, 2004). 
 10 Id. at 18. 
 11 KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH (Temple Univ. Press 
2004). 
 12 Id. 42. 
 13 Id. at 17. 
 14 See GERALD L. NEWMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19-43 (1996); See also RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS 
FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE:  A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 79-130 (1989); CHARLES 
MCCAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1994). 
 15 Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 16 ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED 
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Act of 1917 which expanded exclusion of immigration to the “Asiatic 
barred zone;”17 the naturalization law system that limited 
naturalization to “White” and after a civil war to African ancestry 
immigrants.18  Subsequent exclusionary acts include the 1924 
National Quota System, which was designed to “ensure stability in the 
ethnic composition of the United States.”19  There are also, 
unfortunately, more recent manifestations of racial exclusion.20  For 
instance, there is the Immigration Act of 1965, though often viewed 
as progressive and liberalizing, nonetheless imposed a 120,000 person 
ceiling on migration from the Western Hemisphere.  This limitation 
was part of a compromise to the fear of a drastic increase in 
immigration from Latin America.21 The motivations behind the 
Reagan administration’s commencement of the interdiction and 
repatriation of Haitian nationals seeking admittance to land is also 
subject of considerable criticism.22  The George H. Bush, Bill Clinton, 
and George W. Bush administrations have all followed this policy of 
aggressive Coast Guard interdiction at sea and summary denials of 
asylum claims by Immigration and Naturalization Service officials.  
Professor Steve Legomsky examined this policy and concluded “[t]he 
public would never [have accepted] this if the boat people were 
Europeans.”23  As one author described, “In the end, asylum seekers 
from Haiti, one of the few nations near the United States with a large 
black population, suffered some of the hardest treatment imaginable 
at the hands of the U.S. government.”24   
III. IMMIGRATION REGIMES AND THE CITIZENSHIP CONSTRUCT 
Exclusionary raced-based acts against immigrants of color are 
not now championed by the government as the basis for its practices 
and should obviously never have been the hallmarks of any rational 
immigration regime.  Immigration regimes  should be based on 
rational economic, political, and humanitarian policies relating to 
both the desires of entrants to a land and  the receiving country’s 
 
STATES SINCE 1850 pp. 123-28 (1988). 
 17 Immigration Act of 1917, Ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-76 (1917). 
 18 IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996). 
 19 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 22-23. 
 20 Immigration Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 921, § 21 (c). 
 21 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 25. 
 22 Id. at 40 
 23 James Harney, Critics of U.S. Policy See Racist Overtones, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 
1992, at 2A (quoting Legomsky). 
 24 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 42. 
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interest and ability to accept those entrants.  Thus, immigration 
affects both bodies that move and the juridical status or label that is 
imposed upon them by virtue of whether the government of 
destination is accepting of those movements.  In other words, 
immigration concerns both a physical phenomenon and legal 
construction through labels such as “alien” and “citizen,” which 
define who are the members of society and who are unwelcome.  
Immigration, as a legal construct, is thus one of the primary vehicles 
used to create a status that both creates identity and defines 
membership.  At least in Western constructions, those who enjoy the 
preferred status of full social and political participants of society are 
recognized as the “citizens.”25 Persons with citizenship status stand in 
sharp contrast with those with silenced, marginalized, and limited 
rights holders of a society, known as aliens.  Immigration law is thus 
“illuminating resource for studying the place of domestic groups in 
the U.S. social hierarchy.”26 Through this legal regime, “the 
government is afforded free reign to treat non-citizens . . .  as it sees 
fit.”27 As demonstrated above, this discretion has facilitated the 
disconnect between the treatment of minority immigrants to the 
rhetoric of inclusion associated with domestic immigration. 
Specifically, despite the fact that most Americans are 
descendants of immigrants and the national character of this 
welcoming and embracing land to immigrants is evidenced by 
Emma Lazarus’ timeless declaration in the New Colossus poem,  
racial minorities have largely not faced a welcoming land 
throughout the history of this land.  Nonetheless, the vast 
majority of Americans abide by the popular belief that holds that 
to be an American citizen, a person did not have to be of any 
particular national, linguistic, religious, or ethnic background.  
All he or she had to do was commit him or herself to the political 
ideology centered on the abstract ideas of liberty, equality, and 
republicanism.  Thus, the universal ideological character of 
American nationality is largely believed to be open to anyone who 
legally enters this land and has the will to become an American citizen. 
The central discussion of the citizenship concept in the United 
States Constitution is addressed in the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
 
 25 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, ET. AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 
PROCESS AND POLICY (West 4th ed. 1998). 
 26 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 40 
 27 Id. 
  
2005 IMMIGRATION AND THE ALLURE OF INCLUSION 1355 
the United States, and the state wherein they reside.”28  This fairly 
straightforward clause establishes two basic ways to achieve 
citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) through naturalization. 
Citizenship by birth can occur by being born within the physical 
boundaries of this land, also known as jus soli, which in Latin means 
by soil. The second means to acquire citizenship by birth is jus 
sanguinis, which in Latin means by blood, by being born outside 
United States’ territory to one or both United States citizen parents.29  
The other means to attain official membership or citizenship is 
through naturalization--the process that an immigrant may 
undertake if he or she chooses to become a citizen. Naturalization 
creates citizenship status through the means and process set forth 
by Congressional enactment.  As a result, though the applicant 
initiates the naturalization process, once begun, the applicant 
nonetheless does not control whether he or she will be deemed 
to have earned the right to be a citizen. 
The ultimate goal for many immigrants is to become a 
permanent resident or citizen. The interest in becoming a citizen 
is understandable because citizenship is a broad concept that is 
supposed to signify the rights afforded and obligations imposed in 
the Constitution, but also is supposed to guarantee an “individual’s 
membership in a political community and the resulting 
relationship between allegiance and protection that binds the 
citizen and the state. It includes the sense of permanent 
inclusion in the political community in a non-subordinate 
condition.30  Practically speaking, citizenship also allows one to seek 
eligibility for the full compliment of economic rights and 
government largess provided to citizens. Thus, theoretically 
citizenship signifies an individual’s “full membership” in a 
community where the ideal of equal membership is theoretically to 
prevail.31  Scholars have argued that because equality and 
belonging are inseparably linked, to acknowledge citizenship is 
to confer “belonging” to the United States.32 
 
 28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 29 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 25, at 276. 
 30 JOSE A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 5 n.12 (1979). 
 31 " Kenneth Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 
(1988). 
 32 Jonathan C. Drimmer, The New Pheus of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution and 
Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667 (1995). 
The scholars can find considerable support in the founding fathers' interpretation of 
this construct prior to the drafting of the Constitution. For instance, the 
authors of the Federalist Papers addressed a form of national citizenship, in 
which citizens were to be endowed with equal rights. John Jay in Federalist No. 
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IV. CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION LAW 
Despite being within a legal framework with a history that is 
less than pristine, the primary United States immigration statute, 
which establishes a largely rational paradigm for those seeking to 
legally enter and stay in this land, is the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952.33 Though this statute is a 
contemporary immigration statute that set forth this country’s 
mandate concerning immigration, even this act contains vestiges 
of antiquated exclusionary regimes.  Nonetheless, pursuant to its 
effort to create a rational and just system, under the INA there are 
several types of immigrants, including labor migrants,34 
professional migrants,35 entrepreneurial migrants,36 and refugees 
and asylees.37 The INA also recognizes a system where otherwise 
deportable or inadmissible aliens may seek safe haven in this country 
if they are in fear of persecution by forces in their homeland.38  Over 
 
2 observed that "to all general purposes we have uniformly been one people-
each individual citizen every where [sic] enjoying the same national rights, 
privileges and protection." THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 10 (John Jay) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). Madison in Federalist No. 57 observed "who are to be the 
electors of the Representatives [in Congress.] Not the rich more than the 
poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the naughty heirs of 
distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious 
fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United 
States. No qualifications of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil 
profession are permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of 
the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 57, (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). Scholars have also agreed that the concept of citizenship is associated with 
notions of equality. Professor Ackerman observed that "[in claiming citizenship, 
an individual - is first and foremost - asserting the existence of a social relationship 
between himself and others. More specifically, a citizen is (by definition) 
someone who can properly claim the right to be treated as a fellow member of 
the political community. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice  in the Liberal  State, 74 
(Yale University, 1980). Professor Fox, who recently examined the history of the 
term, observed that while "Madison and the other authors of The Federalist 
Papers may have had little to say about the substance of ... citizenship, they did 
believe that such a thing existed, that it defined a sphere of equality." James W. 
Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism, 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT.  L.  REV. 421 
(1999). James Kettner similarly noted "revolution created the Status of 
`America citizen' and produced an expression of the general principles that 
ought to govern membership in a free society ... and it ought to confer equal 
rights."  JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1807 (1978). 
 33 See Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952); U.S.C. 1101 et. seq. 
 34 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 25, at 276. 
 35 Id. at 277. 
 36 Id. at 278. 
 37 Id. at 280. 
 38 Note, Membership Has Its Privileges and Immunities: Congressional Power to 
Define and Enforce the Rights of National Citizenship, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1925, 1932 
(1989). 
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the years, after enactment of the INA, amendments to that statute 
were passed to affect the admissibility of several groups of immigrants 
and asylum seekers. These amendments facilitated the ability of 
certain groups to emigrate, permanently reside, and become 
citizens in this land.  Many of the policies of the INA, despite 
effectively noting the beginning of the end of mid-century race-based  
race quotas to immigration, initiated other policies that continued to 
raise questions concerning the motivations of the act.  For instance, 
the 1952 amendments included in the list of individuals to be 
excluded from immigration those who were “afflicted with psychotic 
personality.”39 After the provision was struck down by the Ninth 
Circuit in Fleuti v. Rosenberg,40  the Act was amended to exclude those 
afflicted with “sexual deviation.” Immigration scholars have 
concluded that these amendments were intended to exclude gays and 
lesbians.41  Another example of controversy associated with the 
contemporary regime is the 1965 amendments to the INA, which 
eliminated the discriminatory quota system of dating back to the 
1920s, but initiated the use of discriminatory diversity visas.  These 
diversity visas limited immigration from the western hemisphere to 
120,000 persons.  This change had its intended affect of limiting 
Latino/a immigration.42 
Given America’s repeated examples of its reluctance to accept 
racial minorities as legal immigrants, it is not difficult to appreciate 
why there may be some cynicism and differing impressions 
concerning the inclusive rhetoric of immigration. This in turn 
may leave many immigrants, who in recent times are 
perceived to be largely from Central and South America, with 
the impression they face entering a land that is not nearly as 
welcoming as its national narrative declares.  The practices of 
interdiction at sea and aggressive border patrols make this view 
abundantly clear.  The cynicism with respect to this country’s 
immigration rules is perhaps best highlighted by the film “The 
Terminal.” The utterly arbitrary reason for denying Navorski’s 
entry merely because his homeland changes governments 
appears analogous to the denial of or limits on immigration for 
certain groups merely because of where a person is from or 
whether we oppose the political structure of the immigrant’s 
 
 39 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (4) (1952). 
 40 302  F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).  See also William B. Turner, Lesbian/Gay Rights 
and Immigration Policy: Lobbying to End the Medical Model, 7 J. Pol’y Hist. 208-25 
(1995). 
 41 HING, supra note 9, at 82-91; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 140-51. 
 42 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 25. 
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homeland.  There is an irony in that the fictional portrayal of 
Victor Navorski is probably an enormously effective and non-
threatening means to address struggles for identity and inclusion 
faced by immigrant groups. Navorski’s, tale is also so engulfing 
because of its plethora of statements concerning this country’s 
identity and acceptance of outsiders. For instance, shortly 
before he is stopped at the airport, Navorski witnesses scores of 
other foreigners arriving and departing the airport area, yet 
upon first being detained, he cannot understand why he is 
unable to even step a foot outside the airport. While in the film the 
basis for the other individual cases of immigration is not 
discernable, outside the explicitly fictional world of film, the 
immigration policies of the U.S. and most western nation-states 
all too often do not appear more coherent than something out 
of a fictional tale like The Terminal.  The sheer absurdity of 
Navorski’s exclusion is due to a regime change in his homeland, 
which leaves him literally “stuck at the border.” 
Similarly, in the far more troubling real life travesty of 
Merhan  Nasseri, the French government has prevented him 
from leaving an airport for over a decade because he was of 
being expelled from his homeland for protesting against a 
dictator and then had his legal documents stolen.43  
Unfortunately, Navorski and Nasseri’s troubles are not unlike the 
apparent arbitrariness associated with legal distinctions drawn to 
permit and prevent individuals seeking entrance into the 
United States. Not unlike the arbitrary practices in the film, 
contemporary domestic immigration policies, while framed as 
rational policies deemed to protect the economic and political 
integrity of the country’s infrastructure, upon, closer 
examination, raise questions as to whether the application of 
immigration laws are affected by illegitimate grounds such as 
the racial identity or privileged political status of the immigrant.  
Navorski’s general interest in entering this country was not 
unlike the hundreds of other travelers depicted in the film. 
However, because of circumstances beyond his control, namely 
the coup d’etat that occurred in his homeland, he is deemed, as 
the film depicts, ”unacceptable.”44 The film therefore ultimately 
 
 43 See supra note 4. 
 44 Prior to the enactment of the illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, a noncitizen denied admission at a 
port of entry into this country was considered an “excludable,” the act 
replaced that label with the work “removal.” A noncitizen denied admission at a 
port of entry into this country was considered an “excludable,” the act replaced that 
  
2005 IMMIGRATION AND THE ALLURE OF INCLUSION 1359 
proves to be a provocative critique of how this government treats 
outsiders and foreigners. 
In the actual events in which the film is based, the victim 
of arbitrary entry rules, Merhan Nasseri has been unable to 
leave a French airport for over a decade. If Nasseri was 
detained in a U.S. airport and had other, perhaps preferred, 
identity markers, such as originating from a communist country, 
instead of theocracy-based dictatorship, he probably would not be 
detained indefinitely at an airport. Nasseri, however, is left with no 
alternative but to live off of the assistance of his adoptive airport 
family. This problematic condition is exacerbated by the fact that 
over the years, Nasseri’s physical and mental health has been in a 
rapid state of decline.45  The arbitrariness faced by both Nasseri 
and Navorski, described here as the Nasseri-Navorski 
Phenomenon, can often be evidenced in how in practice this 
country often draws lines and deems otherwise similarly situated 
peoples ineligible for entry. This perceived arbitrariness is 
highlighted when racial constructions are implicated. 
V. ENTERLAND, EXILIOLAND, AND NEVERENTERLAND: 
CITIZENSHIP AS A NONFICTION  GENRE 
A quick reference to this country’s treatment of three 
similar and neighboring peoples illustrates the arbitrary 
distinctions that affect immigrant groups desirous of entering 
this land.  In addition, when examining the treatment of the 
immigrants from these lands, questions arise whether the 
disparate treatment is at least in part due to racial 
constructions.  One need not look much further than a few 
hundred miles to the south of the State of Florida to appreciate a 
Nasseri-Navorski phenomenon. In the tales of the three lands 
described below, the imagined quality of immigration and 
membership are highlighted. Despite similar locales and histories, 
but vastly differing constructions of race, the immigration and 
emigration positions of these three peoples are dramatically 
disparate. The first of these people are from the land that will be 
called “Enterland.” As the name suggests, the people of this country 
can enter and leave freely to and from the United States. They are a 
people from the Caribbean who are not much different from the 
nationals of nearby islands. Though their native tongue is 
 
label with the word “removal.” 
 45 See Matthew Rose, Waiting for Spielberg, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003 (Sept. 2), 2003 
at 82. 
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Spanish, their culture, like those of the people of the surrounding 
countries, largely derives from African, indigenous, and peninsular 
roots. As a result of historical happenstance, this country and by 
extension its people are formally part of the United States.46  These 
people never chose to become part of the United States; they just 
happen to live in a land that became the booty of war.47  Though 
the people of this land are U.S. citizens they do not share the 
same rights of other Fourteenth Amendment U.S. citizens within the 
mainland U.S. or U.S. citizens living in another country, for that 
matter. 
Though these people may exist in a subordinate citizenship 
status, it is that very status that has nevertheless provided them with a 
preferred migration status.48  Specifically, despite the fact that 
nationals of this land are not equal citizens in that they do not 
have formal representation in the government that controls their 
lives,49 their anomalous status empowers them with the right to freely 
enter, leave, and even reside in the U.S. mainland.50  When one 
compares them to similarly situated island people of the Caribbean, 
one can readily take note of the fact that they are similar to many 
in this region that are deemed as a matter of law far less acceptable 
or worthy of residing in the U.S.51  Unlike most other Caribbean 
people, or nationals from just about any other country for that 
matter, if the people of Enterland wish to enter and stay in the 
United States, they can do so for any reason and without any 
restrictions.52 In fact, they may enter for cultural, political, or 
purely economic reasons. All they have to do is purchase or 
otherwise obtain a ticket and board an airplane bound for the 
United States. The primary reason for the status of this group is 
that their land and its people were acquired by the U.S. after 
the Spanish-American War.53  As a result, the people of this island 
group have both a subordinate status under a legal regime of 
U.S. citizenship, but a preferred status under the U.S. 
 
 46 Ediberto Roman, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and other Consequences of U.S. 
Colonialism, 26 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 47 EFREN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY (American 
Psychological Association, Wash. D.C. 2001). 
 48 Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 
VILL. L. REV. 1119 (1997). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See supra note 29, at 3.  
 51 Id. 
 52 FRANCISCO A. SCARANO, PUERTO RICO (McGraw Hill 1993). 
 53 See supra note 30, at 55; supra note 29, at 5; supra note 31, at 1121. 
  
2005 IMMIGRATION AND THE ALLURE OF INCLUSION 1361 
immigration regime vis-à-vis other aliens who do not enjoy 
mainland citizenship. 
The people of the second group are from the country 
called “Exilioland.” These people, like the people of Enterland, 
primarily speak Spanish and are made up of peoples from 
Africa, Spain, and indigenous descendants. In fact, in 
anthropological circles, the people of Enterland and Exilioland 
are widely believed to be originally from the same or similar 
Awarak Indian tribes. Though the people of Exilioland are not 
formal members of the United States, the people of this group 
are deemed to be a politically desirable group. In large 
measure this is because these people are inhabitants of a 
repressive dictatorial regime whose political philosophy is 
antithetical to the United States’ interests in the region. Others, 
who are perhaps more sympathetic to that regime, would note 
that Exilioland is also the only country in the hemisphere which 
has steadfastly opposed the United States’ hegemonic geo-
political interests in the region. In either case, the people of 
this land are also arguably more acceptable in large measure 
because of their value as ideological trophies: they live under a 
repressive government that follows a political system, namely 
Communism that is deemed repugnant to this land’s democratic 
system of governance.54 The people of this group have the 
ability to stay in this country if they merely touch dry land. As 
such, the people of this group hold a preferred immigrant or 
entrance status, although the people of this group often reject 
the notion that they are in fact immigrants, instead claiming an 
exile status. In fact, as a result of the 1965 amendments to the 
INA, Congress adopted a new preference designed to broaden 
overseas refugee programs.55  Persons could qualify for this 
program by establishing that they had “fled” persecution in a 
“communist or communist-dominated country.”56  As a result of those 
amendments, under current immigration laws, the people of this 
group are presumed to be political asylum seekers-despite any 
attendant economic motives for emigration-and are virtually always 
 
 54 Maryellen Fullerton, Cuban Exceptionalism: Migration and Asylum in Spain and 
the United States, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 527 (2004); Berta Esperanza 
Hernandez-Truyol, On Becoming the Other, Cubans, Castro, and Elian -- A LatCritical 
Analysis, 78 Denv. U. L. REV. 687 (2001); Francisco Valdes, Diaspora and Deadlock, 
Miami and Havana: Coming to Terms with Dreams and Dogmas, 55 FL. L. REV. 283 (2003). 
 55 See Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 
Stat. 911 (1965). 
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allowed to stay in the U.S. and they are allowed to become U.S. 
residents faster than any other exile, asylum, or immigrant 
group. 57  In the immigration “wet-foot, dry-foot” legal distinction, 
basically created for this group of people, the federal government 
of this land created a special status for this group. 58  This policy was 
nevertheless more restrictive than previous policies aimed at people 
from such lands such as Exilioland.  Unlike other immigrant or 
exile groups seeking asylum, the people of this land are allowed to 
stay in this land irrespective of whether they can prove a well-founded 
fear of persecution.59  Like the people of Enterland, some of the 
people of Exilioland may seek to migrate to the mainland U.S. for 
economic or other reasons.60  Nevertheless, the people of 
Exilioland are essentially legally deemed to always arrive for political 
asylum reasons, irrespective of whether their undisclosed reasons 
were primarily based upon economic necessity or other concerns.61  
Though some have suggested that the rationale for the unique 
presumed-asylum status of these people is because this group is 
extraordinarily politically active and has a powerful voice in the State 
of Florida,62 which has often been a pivotal state in national elections, 
the rationale behind or irrationality of such law applicable to this 
group is beyond the reach of this essay. What is relevant to this 
project is that despite the fact the first two Caribbean people have 
similar histories, originate from similar peoples, experience 
similar histories as colonies of Spain, gained their independence 
from Spain in the same armed conflict, and arguably were 
controlled by the U.S., at least for a certain period, their 
immigration status is dramatically different.63 
Members of one group, because they are part of the United 
States’ colonial possessions and are ostensibly U.S. citizens, may enter 
and leave the U.S.  Members of the other group, however, because of 
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 58 Id. at 530. 
 59 See Fullerton, supra note 54, at 527. 
 60 See Valdes, supra note 54, at 285. 
 61 See Valdes, supra note 54, at 530. 
 62 See Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 54, at 535. 
 63 Richard Barnes, Refugee Law at Sea, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 47 (Jan. 2004); 
Alberto J. Perez, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy Between Cubans, 
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114 HARV. L. REV. 902 (2001), Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, "Migration 
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this government’s stance against communism and perhaps the 
proximity of their homeland to the United States, are able to 
obtain an expedited asylum status only upon touching dry land 
of the continental U.S.  However, the ability of the people of 
Exilioland to immigrate to the U.S. is significantly more challenging 
than that of the people of Enterland. The people of Enterland, 
because of century-old legal fictions that declared that Enterland is 
paradoxically both foreign and domestic, are deemed worthy of entry 
without having to struggle to literally touch United States soil. The 
people of Exilioland must defy their homeland’s repressive laws, 
illegally emigrate, and touch dry land. Recent events have 
exemplified the absurdity and arbitrariness of such requirements.  
In an actual fact pattern that is probably more peculiar than most 
law professors could envision when drafting a final exam, on 
January 4, 2006, a group of 15 individuals from Exilioland were 
able to touch “dry-land” by landing on a section of the old Seven 
Mile Bridge off the coast of the Florida Keys.64  Despite evidently 
achieving the threshold marker for entry—touching dry land— 
federal immigration officials ruled that because the bridge was 
not currently used by pedestrians and is not actually “touching 
one of the Keys, the bridge was not in fact dry land.  In yet 
another vivid example of the peculiar immigration rules of this 
land, the immigrants were deemed never touched dry land and 
were then repatriated to their homelands, undoubtedly facing 
reprisals from that government.  Recently, the federal government 
agreed to exam the propriety of the “wet- foot, dry-foot” policy in 
part due to a hunger strike initiated by a local political and 
community leader of the Exilioland people residing in the United 
States. 
The people of Exilioland, because of their closed society, 
unlike those in Enterland, cannot simply take an airline flight to 
the United States. Instead, they must risk their lives, often in 
makeshift boats, in shark-infested high seas in order to touch U.S. 
land. Moreover, the people of Exilioland, unlike the people of 
Enterland, are not able to readily and easily return to their 
homeland. 
The people of the third island group come from a land 
called “Neverenterland.” These people like the people of 
Enterland and Exilioland, reside on an island in the Caribbean, 
were once colonial subjects, and derive from Indigenous, African, 
 
64 Cubans Sent Home After Arrival at Bridge Piling, CNN.COM, Jan. 9, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/01/09/cubans.dryland.ap 
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and European cultures, yet are deemed largely unacceptable or 
ineligible for any immigration status that will easily permit them 
entrance.65  In addition, in racial construction terminology they also 
happen to be considered black. It is the racial construction of 
these people that is arguably the greatest difference in the 
perception of these otherwise similarly situated and constructed 
people.  The people of Neverenterland are not part of the U.S. 
colonial landscape and do not reside within a political 
framework that is threatening to the United States.66  Despite the 
fact that they reside only a few hundred miles away from 
Exilioland and Enterland in arguably the same Archipelago of 
islands known as the Antilles,67  these people are neither free to 
enter the United States or are deemed worthy of easily applying 
for political asylum.68  When they arrive on U.S. land, even if they 
touch dry land, they are deemed to be in this country solely for 
economic reasons and under this country’s current immigration 
regime are presumptively ineligible to stay in the country.69  
Despite the fact that the people of Enterland essentially seek to come 
to this land for economic reasons, they are allowed to do so without 
ever facing any perilous journeys at sea. Yet the people of 
Neverenterland routinely risk their lives in dangerously overcrowded 
makeshift transport boats, and are rarely allowed to remain within 
the U.S.70  Unlike the people of Exilioland, even if the people of 
Neverenterland touch dry land, they typically cannot stay in this 
country. They are deemed to be “ineligible” under domestic 
immigration law or “unacceptable” as it is described in the film The 
Terminal.  In many respects Victor Navorski, though in the film he 
is apparently from a European Country, his disparate treatment 
makes him resemble someone from Neverenterland rather than 
Krakozhia.  The people of Neverenterland are constructed as 
unworthy entrants who arrive solely for economic reasons, and 
despite Emma Lazarus’ noble national narrative and an 
economic system that hails economic upward mobility, under 
current domestic immigration policies, an economic motivation 
 
 65 See Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking The 
Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (2004); Perez, supra note 63, at 
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 66 See Weissman, supra note 65, at 260. 
 67 See SCARANO, supra note 52, at 3. 
 68 Kevin R. Johnson, Open borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003). 
 69 Angela P. Harris. Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century 
Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923 (2000). 
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for entry is an insufficient reason for with exception to those from 
Enterland, to be permitted to stay in this country.71 
As one may by now appreciate, the people of Enterland, 
Exilioland, and Neverenterland are actually from Puerto Rico, Cuba, 
and Haiti, respectively. As addressed above, these people live in then 
same island region, have similar histories, often seek to arrive in this 
land for a better life, but are treated differently.72  While the author 
of this essay appreciates that this country cannot easily allow any and 
all people to migrate,  what is sought here is to highlight, not unlike 
the portrayal in The Terminal, the questionable and troubling lines 
drawn and the fictions created to exclude some and include others. 
This is not to say that the people of Cuba or Puerto Rico are unworthy 
of entering and staying within the United States, but the fact is 
that many of the interests of the people of Puerto Rico, and 
arguably for many from Cuba, in arriving probably have more to do 
with quality of life issues, such as economics than with political 
statements, yet both groups are able to stay when they arrive in this 
land. Although the people of Haiti live in a desperate economic 
state and political repression not too dissimilar to the plight of 
the people of Cuba,  They are not allowed to stay in this land, even 
upon touching dry land.  In fact, referring back for a moment to the 
recent debate revolving around the 15 Cuban migrants who recently 
had the misfortune of landing on an old bridge, although many 
opponents of the wet-foot, dry foot policy have sound reason to 
challenge that policy, cynics of immigration priorities may argue 
with some force that but for the Cuban community’s influence in 
local politics in the pivotal State of Florida in national elections, the 
federal government would not have agreed to revisit its odd wet-foot, 
dry-foot distinction for Cuban migrants.  Indeed it is likely that 100 
hunger strikers from Haiti would not have caused such an 
immediate response by the federal government.  Ironically, Haitian 
immigrants to this land are neither politically influential in national 
politics,73 and  paradoxically did not have the good “fortune” to have 
been colonized by the United States, and as a result are unwelcome 
to stay in this land.74 
 
 71 Id. at 1930. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Many minority groups could look to the Cuban Exile community’s success in 
becoming one of the few minority groups, if in fact it is fair to characterize them as 
one, to gain significant political and economic influence on a local and, to some 
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 74 Perez, supra note 63, at 440.   
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VI. THEORETICAL CHALLENGES TO THE CITIZENSHIP NARRATIVE  
The Nasseri-Navorski phenomenon is also used here to 
highlight the arbitrariness of immigration rules and regulations 
touched upon by the articles in the immigration cluster of the IX 
Annual LatCrit Conference.  While the articles themselves are 
difficult to unify other than by noting, in the broadest sense, 
their common themes, they do in one form or another note 
the peculiar consequences of immigration priorities. The 
three articles in the immigration cluster highlight the 
vulnerable and anomalous status of alien groups within this 
land. The articles of Jose Miguel Flores, Maria Pabon Lopez, 
and Arthur Read provide diverse writings touching upon often 
arbitrary rules of exclusion and inclusion.75  The articles 
question the legal creations used to define which groups can stay 
and actively participate in all affairs in this land. Stemming from a 
panel touching upon immigration, educational access, and 
social justice.  The articles address a host of provocative issues 
related to the contemporary immigration debate. In fact, the 
ironies and injustices addressed by the works fit within the 
metaphors raised by the Nasseri-Navorski Phenomenon. 
In the first article, Lopez explores the issue of the right to 
education as applied to undocumented Latina and Latino 
children.76  She argues that the so-called “immigration crisis” in 
the public’s imagination has led to state and federal 
governmental restrictions on the ability of Latina and Latino 
groups to effectively participate in all aspects of society.77 In part 
because of the fear of foreigners heightened by the post-
September 11, 2001 world, the efforts at restrictions have 
included limits on the ability of non-citizens to obtain driver’s 
licenses,78 access to health care,79 access to public assistance80 and 
access to education.81 Lopez characterizes the children of 
 
 75 See e.g., Maria Pabon Lopez, Reflections Regarding the Education of Latino/a 
Undocumented Children: Plyler v. Doe and Beyond, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1367 (2005). 
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 79 See H.R. 3722, 108th Cong. (2004) (the Undocumented Alien Emergency 
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undocumented parents as hostages in the immigration crises, 
particularly in their access to effective education. She argues this 
plight exists despite the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Plyler v. Doe,82 which held that undocumented children are 
entitled to state funded education. Based on the Plyler decision, 
Lopez observes that undocumented children’s right to 
education should have been secure without any efforts to limit 
that right. Despite the pronouncement of Plyler, Lopez argues that 
these vulnerable students continue to face severe challenges in 
educational access and achievement. For instance, she notes that 
state efforts in California,83 Arizona,84 and Massachusetts,85 have 
attempted to dismantle bilingual education. In essence, Lopez’s 
central thesis is that in an era antagonistic to immigrants, Latina 
and Latino children, particularly those of undocumented workers, 
are the most at risk. 
In the year that so many institutions in the legal academy have 
celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the groundbreaking decision 
of Brown v. Board of Education,86  Lopez questions the impact of Plyler 
and laments the failure of courts and scholars to use that 
decision to assist undocumented children.87  The paper argues that 
Plyler must be read as an integral part of Brown’s legacy and notes that 
education, though not currently formalized as a fundamental right 
by U.S. constitutional law, is an essential aspect of membership in this 
society. 
The Lopez article is of some moment in that it advocates for 
greater emphasis on a decision that speaks not only to the 
importance of education, but also to the reality that children of 
undocumented workers are part of this society. The piece effectively 
highlights a perhaps underappreciated decision in terms of its 
importance to the right of education and the rights of 
undocumented children.88  Somewhat surprisingly, the article does 
not, however, use the decisions in Plyler, Brown, and the recent 
 
457 U.S. at 220. 
 82 457 U.S. 202( 1982). 
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Supreme Court affirmative action decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger,89 and 
Grutter v. Bollinger,90 which are also addressed in the article, to 
advocate for the recognition of education as a fundamental right. 
Though the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,91 
decision, which refused to hold that education is a fundamental 
right, was re-affirmed in Plyler,  advocates of the rights of 
undocumented children nonetheless should question San Antonio’s 
logic and constitutional basis. From a political perspective, 
without the recognition of education as fundamental right, 
undocumented children will continue to be at risk and subject 
to political whim. The primary basis for the Supreme Court’s 
refusal in San Antonio to recognize the fundamental nature of 
education stems from the fact that education is not an 
enumerated right in the Constitution.92 What the San Antonio 
Court failed to acknowledge was that there are numerous 
fundamental rights that are not enumerated in the 
Constitution. Those rights include the right to marry,93 the 
right to travel,94 the right to raise children,95 and the right to 
procreate.96 As Lopez illustrates, under the current educational 
as well as immigration regime, the most vulnerable in our 
society have continuously been subject to attack. She illustrates 
that as recently as the year 1996; two federal proposals would 
have effectively overruled Plyler.  In two proposed amendments to 
the Illegal Immigration reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”),97 Representative Elton Gallegly failed but almost 
further limited the rights of the undocumented.98  Lopez further 
points out that at the state level, California’s anti-immigrant 
Proposition 187, if it had not been struck down, contained a 
provision that was designed to overrule Plyler.99 Without the 
recognition of education as a fundamental right it is unlikely 
that the status of undocumented children will change much for 
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the better.100 Thus, Lopez effectively highlights that in the current 
intolerant and arbitrary immigration system, the most 
vulnerable of innocents are often subject to legal attack merely 
because this society is antagonistic to the parents of those 
innocents. The Lopez article demonstrates that in the context 
of education, undocumented children fit within the Nasseri-
Navorski Phenomenon. Not unlike Navorski, who is given the 
right to stay at the airport border until his legal status is 
resolved but is repeatedly stifled in his efforts to feed himself, 
undocumented children were theoretically granted the right to 
public education in Plyler, but have often had that right 
challenged and in practice limited. While Navorski was 
afforded a right, lodging without food, that right was illusory. 
Though Plyler similarly afforded the children of the 
undocumented public education, repeated efforts at curbing 
immigrant rights, Lopez argues, have devalued the value of 
Plyler. 
In the second article of this cluster, Jose Miguel Flores 
addresses issues touching upon what he describes as 
“globalization from below,” or in other words globalization’s 
effect of luring Latina and Latino communities to American 
cities.  Interestingly enough, many observations made by Flores 
concerning Asian and Latina migration into cities do not squarely 
fit within the Navorski-Nasseri phenomenon termed here, but 
the themes raised in the Flores piece do track statements made 
in the film The Terminal. For instance, because Navorski’s 
interim home was in the airport, those who came to his aid were 
people of color who found economic opportunity in the airport. 
Flores notes that in many immigrant communities, other 
immigrant groups created institutions of support.  For instance, 
Flores argues that as a result of globalization, new forms of 
participation and representation are developing in immigrant 
communities. This observation is perhaps the most interesting 
portion of the article in that the author uses vivid examples of 
the creation of transnational economic networks, including 
entities such as the Tepeyac Association of New York, which 
provides cultural support to Mexican immigrant communities. A 
similar notion of self-empowerment could be observed in the 
 
 100 See Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary 
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Terminal when individuals representing minority or outsider 
groups in the airport provided Navorski with food and social 
support. 
In what could be described as a sociologically focused 
project, without a significant emphasis on immigration or the 
other domestic laws, Flores observes that as a result of 
globalization, Latinas and Latinos “are lured to America’s cities 
by the economic forces.”  While this thesis is interesting, how this 
recent migration differs from migration throughout the last 
century is not explored by the Flores article. Nonetheless, the 
piece makes some worthwhile observations. By examining the 
Latina and Latino migration in New York’s Jackson Heights and 
Los Angeles’ Boyle Heights, Flores attempts to highlight the new 
mestizaje or the mixing of cultural forces occurring in American 
cities. Another question is raised by this part of the thesis, 
namely, whether this mixing of cultures is a byproduct of 
globalization, trends of migration, or other forces.  Nonetheless, 
Flores in a cogent fashion traces the changing face of American 
cities as well as the development of networks of immigrant-
centered programs. 
The third article in the cluster, written by Arthur Read, is 
perhaps the most provocative and ambitious in that it squarely 
confronts a policy that is often characterized as benefiting new 
immigrant workers. The article questions the propriety of 
temporary or guest workers programs, which he argues all too often 
disproportionally affect immigrant and minority communities. 
Specifically, the article challenges President Bush’s efforts at 
characterizing the expansion of such programs as immigration 
reform. 
In his advocacy for expanded temporary worker’s programs, the 
President argued that under his proposal, the program will match 
the employers with temporary workers, when American employers 
cannot fill job openings with Americans.101  In return, according 
to the President, the workers will obtain a provisional legal status as 
well as employment.102  Once again, a related subject was depicted 
in the rhetorical tool used here to organize these articles-The 
Terminal. Not unlike the only real choice undocumented workers 
 
 101 See Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Proposes New Temporary 
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often have for employment, Navorski was left with no other alternative 
to make a livelihood other than to take an illegal or “off the books” 
construction job. In part what makes the Read article so insightful is 
that it challenges an effort proposed by the President which was 
promoted as a vehicle of immigration reform aimed at providing 
legal employment opportunities for otherwise undocumented 
workers.103 Read characterizes the President’s proposals as “the big 
lies.”104  In somewhat summary fashion, the article points out that 
the primary reason that employers interested in such programs 
cannot find American workers is because they are unwilling to pay 
living wages.105 The article compares the President’s proposal with 
the 1942 “Bracero” program, which the article suggests led to abuses. 
In essence, the article points out that the proposed expanded 
temporary workers program ultimately harms all workers. In 
what is perhaps the only suggestion a reader may have for this 
piece is that in a relatively brief fashion the article raises so 
many interesting points and sets forth so many interesting 
arguments, that the project begs for a more expansive 
examination of the subject. In addition, the article makes only 
passing reference to the economic costs of its proposals. 
Nevertheless, this is an impressive work that is so important 
and thoughtful that it will likely lead to further works on the 
subject. For instance, in a persuasive summation of his 
argument, Read observes: 
When the rights of undocumented and migrant workers are not 
protected, the rights of all workers are diminished. Unscrupulous 
employers seek out undocumented immigrants or temporary 
workers because they believe that there are no consequences 
for violating their rights. These employers gain a competitive 
advantage over employers who abide by the law. This creates a 
perverse incentive for employers to hire undocumented 
workers, over citizens or authorized workers.106 
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LEGAL LIFE AS FICTION 
In conclusion, both Nasseri and his fictional alter ego, 
Victor Navorski, exist in many ways in a status that similar to 
the odd immigration status of the Caribbean people of Haiti. 
Both Nasseri and Navorski were placed in a strange place 
where they should have been deemed eligible immigrants 
and visitors, but were nonetheless are deemed unworthy of 
entry due to forces outside their control. This essay 
similarly compares the national narrative of “the land of 
immigrants” and the welcoming invitations to the “hungry 
and huddled masses yearning to breathe freely” with a 
history of exclusionary policies that were immorally aimed 
at excluding disfavored groups.  Politics and prejudice, and 
not cogent economic, political, or humanitarian 
considerations, have for too long been the basis for a 
considerable portion of our immigration regimes.  Each of 
the articles in the LatCrit cluster examines provocative 
immigration issues and likewise questions and explores what 
appears to be a peculiar and often times arbitrary legal 
regimes. These articles also arguably go beyond their explicit 
statements concerning immigration; they also speak to issues 
touching upon the legal construction of membership and 
otherness. As these articles point out, opportunity, 
participation, membership, and immigration are inseparably 
linked. All too often the rhetoric of membership has 
conflicted with reality when one bothers to explore the 
history of people of color seeking membership. The articles in 
this cluster aptly highlight contemporary manifestations of this 
tension. By examining the failure of formal legal approaches 
to provide meaningful opportunities, and humane reform, the 
articles critique the real life struggles of outsiders within a 
legal framework that often does not live up to its purported 
basis or rationality. 
 
 
